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Abstract
Between 2001 and 2014, 78 reported measles cases resulted from transmission in U.S. healthcare 
facilities and 29 healthcare personnel were infected from occupational exposure, of whom 1 
transmitted measles to a patient. The economic impact of preventing and controlling measles 
transmission in healthcare facilities was $19,000–$114,286 per case.
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Background
Measles is an acute febrile rash illness that is transmitted by direct contact with infectious 
droplets or by airborne spread. Approximately 8% of measles case-patients experience 
diarrhea as a complication, 7–9% develop otitis media, 1–6% acquire pneumonia, and 1–2 
per 1000 case-patients develop encephalitis[1]. Death occurs in 1–3 per 1000 cases.
Measles was declared eliminated (defined as the interruption of continuous transmission 
lasting ≥12 months) from the U.S. in 2000 due to high two-dose measles-mumps-rubella 
(MMR) vaccination coverage, improved measles control in the World Health Organization 
Region of the Americas, and intensive and rapid public health responses to imported 
measles cases[2]. However, even in an elimination era, imported cases and limited spread 
still occur. Due to the severity of measles, it is not uncommon for infected individuals to 
seek medical care at primary care centers, pediatric offices, emergency departments, or 
hospitals[3]. Our objectives were to assess during the post-elimination era the frequency of 
measles transmission in healthcare facilities in the United States, determine the number of 
healthcare personnel (HCP) infected with measles while at work, evaluate two-dose MMR 
vaccine failure in healthcare facilities and subsequent spread, and describe the estimated 
economic burden of measles outbreak responses in U.S. healthcare facilities.
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We assessed measles surveillance data reported to the National Center for Immunization and 
Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) from January 1, 
2001 through December 31, 2014 to determine the number of measles cases transmitted in 
U.S. healthcare facilities or among HCP. We also searched PubMed from January 2001 
through December 2014 using the search terms “measles”, “transmission”, and “vaccine 
failure” to identify documented instances of individuals with two prior doses of MMR 
vaccine who became infected with measles and transmitted the virus. We did an additional 
PubMed search using the search terms “measles”, “economic”, and “health care” to 
determine the estimated range spent by U.S. healthcare facilities in response to measles 
case-patients or outbreaks in their facilities. We cross-referenced articles referenced in the 
above searches that were not captured in the database search.
Results
Between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 20141, 1822 measles cases were reported in the 
U.S. (annual median: 64.5, range: 37–668), of which 504 were imported cases, 1191 were 
secondary and tertiary cases, and 127 had an unknown source. Of the 1191 secondary and 
tertiary cases, 78 (6.5%) were transmitted in U.S. healthcare facilities, including 29 cases in 
HCP who were infected as a result of occupational exposure, of whom 1 transmitted measles 
to a patient2 (Table 1). The tertiary transmission from HCP to patient occurred during a 
measles outbreak in 2008; the vaccination status of the provider was unknown[4]. Of the 29 
HCP who were infected with measles, 19 (65.5%) had adequate presumptive evidence of 
measles immunity which includes: written documentation of vaccination with 2 doses of live 
measles or MMR vaccine administered at least 28 days apart, laboratory evidence of 
immunity, laboratory confirmation of disease, or birth before 19573[5]. In addition to the 29, 
there were 5 measles cases among HCP who were either infected outside of work or had an 
unknown transmission setting. Although we did not include these 5 HCP, they had the 
potential to pass on measles to their patients or other healthcare providers.
Of the 1822 case-patients, at least 914 (50.2%) sought medical evaluation including clinical 
diagnosis, supportive care, laboratory testing, or hospitalization, placing HCP and patients at 
risk for measles exposures. Although some of the case-patients had laboratory specimens 
collected during home health visits rather than visiting healthcare facilities, these 
interactions still placed HCP at risk for measles.
Secondary measles transmission from patients to HCP with two-dose MMR vaccine failure 
has been reported, but has always been a rare event. Often, transmission to a person with 
two-dose MMR vaccine failure results in modified or inapparent measles. This was 
12014 data are through December 31, 2014 and are provisional.
2Transmission setting data were available for 1452 (79.7%) of 1822 measles case-patients. Among the 29 HCP who had occupational 
exposure, data on transmission setting were 100% complete, while among the 5 HCP not included in the analysis, 1 was infected 
outside of work and 4 had an unknown transmission setting.
3For unvaccinated personnel born before 1957 who lack laboratory evidence of measles immunity or laboratory confirmation of 
disease, healthcare facilities should consider vaccinating personnel with 2 doses of MMR vaccine at the appropriate interval. In 
outbreaks, 2 doses are recommended for all HCP who do not have other evidence of immunity, including those born before 1957.
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described in 2 case studies of modified measles in physicians vaccinated with at least 2 
doses of MMR vaccine who were exposed to primary measles cases in 2009[6]. Neither of 
these physicians had tertiary transmission of measles to their patients. We also did not find 
any literature describing tertiary measles transmission in healthcare facilities among HCP 
with two-dose MMR vaccine failure who presented with classic measles symptoms.
The economic impact was described in four U.S. healthcare facilities that implemented a 
public health response to prevent or control the spread of measles after one or more measles 
patients sought medical treatment in their facilities. Costs assessed included the number of 
HCP furloughed, time spent reviewing employee records for evidence of measles immunity, 
and time spent conducting serologic tests and administering vaccine doses. A healthcare 
facility in Illinois spent an estimated $19,000 responding to 1 measles case-patient who 
presented to its emergency department in 2008[7], a medical center in New York spent 
$63,000 responding to two measles case-patients in 2011($31,500/case)[8], an Indiana 
healthcare facility spent $113,000 responding to 3 case-patients in 2005($37,667/case)[9], 
and two Arizona hospitals spent $800,000 responding to 7 measles case-patients in their 
facilities in 2008 ($114,286/case)[4].
Discussion
Despite being an eliminated disease in the U.S., 1822 measles cases were reported in the 
U.S. from 2001 through 2014, of which at least 50.2% sought medical evaluation. These 
cases placed HCP and other patients at risk for measles exposures, and the healthcare 
facilities at risk for being sites of potential transmission. In recent measles outbreaks, 
measles was not considered in the differential diagnosis during the patient’s arrival at the 
healthcare facility[4, 6]. Thus, although airborne precautions are recommended when caring 
for patients with known or suspected measles, which requires placement of suspect or 
confirmed measles patients into Airborne Infection Isolation Rooms[10], the implementation 
of these precautions was often either delayed or not done at all. This resulted in the exposure 
of others in the waiting room, the laboratory, and other common areas in the facility.
Measles is the most contagious of the vaccine-preventable diseases[1]. Patients are 
infectious 4 days before through 4 days after rash onset. The virus can remain in the air for 
up to 2 hours after the patient leaves the area. The measles component of the MMR vaccine 
is approximately 93% effective for 1 dose and 97% effective for two doses[1]. In order to 
protect HCP against measles, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) 
recommends that all HCP have presumptive evidence of immunity to measles[5]. 
Documentation of this in the healthcare setting can be facilitated by maintaining accurate 
HCP vaccination records, particularly electronic records[5]. For additional protection of 
HCP, ACIP recommended in 2011 that all healthcare personnel caring for patients with 
suspect or confirmed measles wear respiratory protection at least as protective as an N95 
respirator, regardless of presumptive evidence of immunity to measles[5]. This is because 
transmission has occurred in healthcare personnel who have serologic evidence of immunity 
or have had two doses of vaccine, although it is a rare occurrence[6, 11].
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It has been hypothesized that the absence or reduced severity of measles-related respiratory 
symptoms, particularly a cough, may result in lower infectivity[12]. Persons with two-dose 
MMR vaccine failure may be less infectious and transmit less. Some previous investigations 
have found no evidence that persons with modified or inapparent measles virus infections 
shed measles virus[12]. Nonetheless, rare instances of secondary or tertiary transmission 
have been documented in non-healthcare settings among persons with two-dose MMR 
vaccine failure who have had classic measles symptoms. In New York City in 2011, a two-
dose vaccinated theater employee transmitted measles to 4 individuals with presumptive 
evidence of immunity against measles[13]. In Pennsylvania in 2003, a two-dose vaccinated 
individual transmitted measles to 2 unvaccinated persons[14]. In Finland in 1989, two-dose 
vaccinated and unvaccinated primary patients were found to be equally contagious within 
families[15]. In Wisconsin in 1986, a two-dose vaccinated index patient with classic 
symptoms transmitted to 13 previously vaccinated (likely 1-dose vaccinated) 
classmates[16]. These situations are uncommon and do not suggest a need for change in 
current measles vaccine policy, but they highlight that transmission can occur from two-dose 
vaccinated individuals.
The U.S. has high population immunity against measles due to the Vaccines for Children 
Program (a national initiative that entitles uninsured or underinsured children to free 
vaccine), the 2-dose measles-vaccination schedule, and school-entry vaccination 
requirements[17]. However, as long as measles remains endemic in many parts of the world, 
the measles virus will continue to be imported into the U.S. These imports and subsequent 
exposures have the potential for serious or fatal outcomes in susceptible high risk 
individuals. There is also the potential to cause significant disruption in healthcare facilities, 
resulting in substantial response costs. Since many individuals infected with measles seek 
medical treatment, HCP remain at risk for measles exposures. HCP should be familiar with 
the signs and symptoms of measles and should obtain a travel history in patients presenting 
with a rash and fever. Rapid case identification with implementation of airborne precautions, 
including the use of respiratory protection at least as protective as a NIOSH certified N-95 
respirator for patient care[5], is critical.
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Table 1
Measles Cases Transmitted in U.S. Healthcare Facilities, January 1, 2001–December 31, 20141
Year No. of measles cases 
transmitted
in U.S. healthcare facilities
No. of HCP infected at
work
Did HCP transmit measles to
patients or other HCP?
Evidence of immunity2 status of
infected HCP
2014 20 11 No 6 had ≥2 MMR doses,
2 had positive titers,
1 had 1 MMR dose,
1 born before 1957,
1 unknown vaccination status
2013 7 3 No 2 had positive titers (1 of whom
also had 1 MMR dose),
1 unknown vaccination status
2012 3 1 No 1 had 2 MMR doses
2011 15 6 No 2 had positive titers,
2 were unvaccinated,
1 unknown vaccination status,
1 had 2 MMR doses
2010 1 1 No 1 had 2 MMR doses
2009 9 2 No 2 had >2 MMR doses
2008 13 1 Yes- infected 1 patient 1 unknown vaccination status
2006 1 0 N/A3 N/A
2005 3 1 No 1 unvaccinated
2002 4 2 No 1 unvaccinated,
1 born before 1957
2001 2 1 No 1-dose vaccinated
TOTAL 78 29 Yes (Once in 2008) 19 (65.5%) had adequate evidence
of measles immunity
1
2014 data are through December 31, 2014 and are provisional.
2
Presumptive evidence of immunity to measles for persons who work in healthcare facilities includes any of the following: written documentation 
of vaccination with 2 doses of live measles or MMR vaccine administered at least 28 days apart, laboratory evidence of immunity, laboratory 
confirmation of disease, or birth before 1957 (However, for unvaccinated personnel born before 1957 who lack laboratory evidence of measles 
immunity or laboratory confirmation of disease, health-care facilities should consider vaccinating personnel with 2 doses of MMR vaccine at the 
appropriate interval. For unvaccinated personnel born before 1957 who lack laboratory evidence of measles immunity or laboratory confirmation of 
disease, health-care facilities should recommend 2 doses of MMR vaccine during an outbreak of measles.)
3
N/A means not applicable.
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